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The Kunduz River Valley of northern Afghanistan and the Vakhsh River Valley of southern
Tajikistan followed what initially appear to be vastly different trajectories. Despite these
two adjacent areas having had much in common throughout many periods of history, the
present-day region of northern Afghanistan was eventually taken under the control of the
Afghan state while the areas north of the Amu Darya and Panj River were to become part of
the Soviet Union. However, instead of a divergent course of development and state-
building, these two regions were subjected to very similar patterns of agricultural devel-
opment and migration policies. “Empty” areas were to be populated, by force if necessary,
wetlands were to be drained for agriculture, and cotton farming was to become pre-
eminent. The end result in both areas was the creation of a socially diverse and
economically signiﬁcant region that was fully integrated into the modern state’s economy
and politics. This article analyzes and compares the motives and implementation of the
state-building projects in both of these now domestically important regions and ﬁnds
remarkable similarities despite the obvious differences in the structure of the Afghan and
Soviet states.
Copyright  2011, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The northern Qataghan region of Afghanistan is now
three separate provinces: Kunduz, Takhar and Baghlan. The
Kunduz River Valley in particular is an obviously important
region in terms of agricultural production (Michel, 1959),
but it also has been a strategic objective for numerous
military forces. The Soviets and the Afghan Communist
government fought the mujahideen in this region in the-PaciﬁcResearchCenter,Hany1980s and then, after the Soviet withdrawal and the
collapse of the Najibullah government, various militias
fought to gain control over Kunduz and the surrounding
area. Later in the 1990s Kunduz was taken by the Taliban,
but not for long as the American-led offensive would
defeat the Taliban in their last northern stronghold in
Kunduz. A decade later, the insurgency in Kunduz and the
surrounding areas is strong and steadily gaining strength.
In terms of social and demographic characteristics of this
region, the diversity and social fragmentation are remark-
able. To understand this better, this article will provide an
overview and analysis of the government-led social and
demographic changes that resulted in the confused
patterns that exist here today.
Just north of Kunduz and across the river border is the
Khatlon Province of Tajikistan, most notably the Vakhsh
Valley in the west of the province. This area, also a veryangUniversity.ProducedanddistributedbyElsevierLimited.All rights reserved.
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of the civil war of 1992–1997, particularly in the ﬁrst year of
conﬂict as it was the most important strategic objective
besides the capital of Dushanbe. The Vakhsh Valley, and
various towns within the area, was strongly contested by
various militias – resulting in the ﬂow of numerous refu-
gees. At times forming the core of a separate province
known as Qurghonteppa, the Vakhsh Valley was histori-
cally subjected to similar government policies as the
Qataghan region of Afghanistan. This is, of course, despite
the development of the Vakhsh Valley being a Soviet
project and the Qataghan region being developed accord-
ing to the imperatives of various Kabul-based governments.
Both the Soviet and Afghan governments had a plan to
subdue, transform and control these two regions. Kunduz
and Vakhsh, which share so much common history and
culture, appear to be good candidates for a comparative
case study. However, despite the similarities there is only
one comparative study – a brief survey of ethnic groups on
either side of the border (Centlivres & Centlivres-Demont,
1997). This article seeks to ﬁll that gap in the literature
with this comparative case study of southern Tajikistan and
northern Afghanistan covering a period from the late 19th
century into the 1970s.
Map 1. The Vakhsh and Kunduz River Valleys.1
2. Afghanistan
2.1. Pre-Afghan demography of the Qataghan region
Various Turkic migrations into the Qataghan region
(Kunduz, Baghlan and Takhar provinces since 1964) of
present-day northern Afghanistan served to displace part
of the autochthonous Iranian-speaking population. By the
mid-19th century the Uzbeks dominated lower Qataghan,
having displaced the Turco-Mongol groups, some of whom
had arrived here as early as the 8th century. The Turco-
Mongol groups in turn migrated to upper Qataghan and
south-western Badakhshan. And in turn, many of the Tajiks
ended up being pushed into mountainous areas (Centlivres
& Centlivres-Demont, 1997, pp. 3–13; Noelle, 1997, p. 63).
Thomas Barﬁeld, describing the Uzbeks in Qataghan as1 Public domain NASA satellite photo (2007) courtesy of http://www.
nasaimages.org/. Modiﬁcations: photo cropped and text added.both farmers and semi-nomadic (as opposed to the long-
range Arab nomads), states:
At the end of the 19th century we ﬁnd each of the three
ethnic groups, Uzbek, Tajik and Arab, holding a partic-
ular niche in a large regional system. Urban centers and
irrigated river valleys were under the control of Uzbek.
Turkic semi-nomadism was common but involved only
short migration; Political and military power had
allowed the Uzbek to control themost fertile valleys and
plains as well as those accessible mountain valley
territories [.] (Barﬁeld, 1978, p. 28).
Yet despite this historical displacement of Tajiks, during
the late 19th century the Uzbek population formed
a minority amongst the sedentary Tajik population in the
important town of Kunduz (McChesney, 1991, p. 257;
Noelle, 1997, p. 63). This ﬁts with Friedrich Kussmaul’s
similar description of Uzbek and Tajik ecological niches. He
notes that in this region the majority of the Uzbeks were
semi-nomadic while Tajiks were farmers and craftsmen.
Furthermore, the Tajiks dominated the towns and bazaars
in eastern Afghan Turkestan (northern Afghanistan),
resulting in their Persian dialect being the lingua franca of
commerce despite Uzbeks having political supremacy. This
is in obvious contrast to the dominant demographic status
of the Uzbek language in the western areas of Afghan
Turkestan (Noelle, 1997, pp. 63–64).
2.2. Afghan expansion into northern Afghanistan
Before Amir Abdur Rahman Khan’s reign in Afghanistan
(1880–1901) there were very few Pashtuns in the north
(Barﬁeld, 1981, p. 16; Lee, 1996, pp. 480–481; Shahrani,
1998, p. 221, n. 14; Tapper, 1983, p. 238). After coming to
power in 1880, Abdur Rahman started a process that has
been variously referred to as ‘internal imperialism,’ ‘interior
colonization,’ ‘Afghanization,’ ‘Pashtun colonization,’ and
‘Pashtunization’ (Hyman, 2002, pp. 306–307; Lee, 1996, pp.
483, 595; Rasuly-Paleczek, 2001, p. 153; Tapper, 1983). And
since Abdur Rahman’s rise to power, almost every Afghan
ruler until 1979 had a policy of attempting to ‘homogenize’
the peoples of Afghanistan. As part of this process (here-
after ‘Pashtunization’), the Afghan government used
Pashtun nationalist ideology, land conﬁscation, discrimi-
natory taxation policies and forced resettlement that
favored the Pashtuns (Aslanov, Gafferberg, Kisliakov,
Zadykhina, & Vasilyeva, 1969, p. 74; Lee, 1996, p. 480, n.
135; Rasuly-Paleczek, 1998, p. 216, 2001, p. 156; Schetter,
2005, p. 58; Shahrani, 1998, p. 8). Lee stresses the inter-
national dimension to these plans by referring to Abdur
Rahman’s population transfer policies as the ‘Yate plan,’
after its British supporter Major Yate (Lee, 1996, pp. 480–
483; Tapper, 1983, p. 250). Through this process, Abdur
Rahman was able to consolidate his rule and control the
non-Pashtun lands in the north. This resulted in the
Uzbeks, Turkmens, Tajiks and others in Afghan Turkestan
losing their best lands to Pashtun settlers (Aslanov et al.,
1969, p. 74; Hyman, 2002, pp. 306–307; Rasuly-Paleczek,
1998, p. 216, 2001, p. 156).
In the late 1880s and early 1890s, Abdur Rahman forced
thousands of Pashtuns to migrate north to Afghan
C. Bleuer / Journal of Eurasian Studies 3 (2012) 69–79 71Turkestan. This allowed him to exile opponents from the
south as well as to create a group of loyal citizens in the
north amongst the Uzbeks, Tajiks and others, where the
Pashtuns would feel it necessary to ally with the central
government (Dupree, 1997, pp. 418–419). Before 1885, all
Pashtuns migrating to the north had done so involuntarily
– and usually as punishment for opposing state policies.
However, after 1885 Abdur Rahman introduced voluntary
migration to the north by offering ﬁnancial and social
incentives for Pashtun settlers (Tapper, 1983, pp. 238–239).
In many cases voluntary migrants to the north were
provided with travel expenses, animals, free land in
perpetuity and a three year tax exemption. Many accepted
this offer. Abdur Rahman’s policies of voluntary migration
for sedentary Pashtuns proved to be more successful than
previous forced attempts, especially regarding nomads
(Kakar, 1979, p. 134). From 1886 Abdur Rahman also started
to encourage Pashtun nomads to migrate to the north
(Tapper, 1983, p. 241). Of course, this voluntary migration
was only in a northward direction. In 1885 Abdur Rahman
had issued a decree forbidding anyone from moving north
to south (Lee, 1996, p. 482). Despite the introduction of
incentive-based voluntary migration, deportations of
Pashtuns to the north continued after 1885 (Lee, 1996, p.
481; Tapper, 1983, pp. 238–239). In the three years from
1885 to 1888 the Pashtun population may have increased
by a factor of eight, from 3500 Pashtun families to as many
as 40,000 (Lee, 1996, p. 484). There was a pause in migra-
tion in the late 1880s caused by the rebellions of the Ghilzai
Pashtuns in eastern Afghanistan and Sardar Muhammad
Ishaq, the governor of Afghan Turkestan and a cousin of
Abdur Rahman (Kakar, 1979, p. 135). However, the
suppression of the Ishaq Khan rebellion facilitated further
Pashtunization. Although many of the exiled Pashtuns
joined in the Ishaq Khan rebellion in 1888 (Lee, 1996, pp.
495–507), following the defeat of Ishaq Khan as many as
10,000 people of various ethnicities from Afghan Turkestan
were executed, tortured to death or allowed to die from
neglect in the overcrowded jails. Furthermore, their prop-
erty and belongings were conﬁscated (Lee, 1996, pp. 547–
551, 559–560). Abdur Rahmanwas then able to redistribute
the conﬁscated land to Pashtuns (Lee, 1996, p. 482).
Another punishment that facilitated Pashtunization in the
north was exile of non-Pashtuns from north to south. For
example, after the Ishaq Khan rebellion 12,000 Uzbek
families were exiled to Kabul and Jalalabad (Kakar, 1979, p.
135; Lee, 1996, p. 560).2 Finally, northward migration
during Rahman’s reign came to an end with the start of the
Hazara War in the early 1890s and did not resume during
his reign (Kakar, 1979, p. 135).
Pashtunization continued into the twentieth century
with the arrival of Pashtun herders in the north during the
1910s through 1940s, displacing more Uzbeks and Tajiks
from their land (Shahrani,1979, p.180). From the 1930s into
the 1970s Uzbeks and Tajiks lost hundreds of thousands of2 Uzbeks were also exiled south at later dates. In either the very late
1890s or early 1900s the Afghan government exiled some Uzbeks south to
Ghazni for supporting opponents of the government. See Babakhodzhaev
cited in Naby (1984, p. 3).acres of cultivated land and pasture, land which was then
given or sold to Pashtun settlers (Shahrani, 2001, pp. 5–6;
Shalinsky, 1982, p. 79). In Takhar Province, Pashtun colo-
nists pushed Uzbeks herders and Tajik, Moghol and Qarluq
farmers out of the irrigated lowlands and into the agricul-
turally marginal foothills (Centlivres & Centlivres-Demont,
1997, pp. 9–10). One event in particular was used to rein-
vigorate the conﬁscation of land from non-Pashtuns. After
the 1929 defeat of the short-lived rebel Tajik Amir Hab-
ibullah Ghazi, also known as Habibullah Kalakani, but
better known as ‘Bacha Saqao,’3 the Pashtuns in the north
gained even more land as the newly restored Pashtun
Durrani rulers conﬁscated land from the local Tajiks,
Aimaqs and Uzbeks who had supported Bacha Saqao
(Tapper, 1983, pp. 257–258). Additionally, the practice of
exiling rebellious Pashtuns to the north continued as late as
the end of the 1940s, particularly after the defeat of the
Saﬁ Pashtun revolt in eastern Afghanistan (Shahrani, 1986,
p. 58).
The process of Pashtunization did not just affect
farmers. Pashtun settlers that arrived as part of the
Afghan government’s migration policies from the 1920s
to the 1960s pushed Uzbek pastoralists into the foothills,
allowing Pashtuns to dominate the developed agricultural
areas. As a result, the foothills are mostly populated by
a Turcophone population which had previously inhab-
ited the plains (Centlivres & Centlivres-Demont, 1997,
pp. 7–8). Nomads in the north sometimes returned to
winter camps to ﬁnd their grazing land partially or fully
occupied by government-backed farmers who have
moved in and were farming with the help of government
irrigation schemes (Dupree, 1997, p. 179). During Abdur
Rahman’s rule the Uzbeks were “partly nomadic” (Kakar,
1979, p. 123), so this would have affected some Uzbeks.
Nomads from the south continued to switch their pasture
lands to the north as late as the 1970s (Tapper, 1983,
p. 251), creating even more competition for the available
grazing land (Dupree, 1989, pp. 34–35). Both nomadic
Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtuns were sent north by the
government. Some of these nomads adopted a sedentary
life and went from a contentious relationship with the
central government to an alliance with the government
(Roy, 1992, p. 74). Rasuly-Paleczek notes that Pashtuns in
general who were sent to the north became allies for and
representatives of the central government (Rasuly-
Paleczek, 2001, p. 155). These descriptions obviously do
not include Pashtuns sent north who were government
workers and their families (Dupree, 1997, pp. 155–159;
Shahrani, 1979, p. 181).2.3. The strategy of Pashtunization
There were three basic motivations for Abdur Rahman’s
migration policies: (1) as a response to Russian maneu-
vering in Central Asia, (2) a counter-measure for the ethnic
heterogeneity of Afghan Turkestan and its hostility to the3 A derogatory name that translates to “water carrier’s son,” a dismis-
sive assessment of a person from an low-status background. However, the
name is used with no negative connotation by most scholars.
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the economic development of lands there (Tapper, 1983, p.
256). Most immediately, Abdur Rahman’s main motivation
for his migration policies was to populate the northern
areas with his presumably more loyal Pashtun co-ethnics.
This would also bring economic gain to the central
government as well as help to secure the frontier and
defend against potential invasions from the north. And, as
previously noted, Pashtunization became quite a useful tool
for Abdur Rahman to exile his political opponents from
other Pashtun tribes (Tapper, 1984, p. 235).
Before Abdur Rahman consolidated his authority over
the territory of Afghan Turkestan, the main political
authority in these areas was not the Afghan government
but instead the local Uzbek semi-independent khanates
(Tapper, 1984, p. 233). According to the British ofﬁcer
Captain Maitland, Abdur Rahman’s resettlement policies
were aimed partly at thinning the Uzbek population of the
north “with people on whose support he can rely in case of
foreign invasion” (Tapper, 1983, p. 239). Indeed, Abdur
Rahman agreed, as seen in the rhetoric he used to justify his
plans:
“The Turkomans and the Uzbeks disobeyed the
commandment of God, they used to capture Mussal-
mans and sold them as slaves. None of their priests and
leading men ever forbade them to do so. At last the
vengeance of God overtook them and the Russians
subdued them. I wish to set them free.”
“It is proper that, as the King is an Afghan [Pashtun], his
tribesmen, the Afghans [Pashtuns], should guard the
frontier” (Lee, 1996, p. 477).
Clearly, population transfers of Pashtuns to the north
were not just economic, but strategic; Rahman wanted to
secure the border against any further Russian encroach-
ment (Tapper, 1983, pp. 235–237). This policy continued
well after Abdur Rahman’s time on the throne. For example,
in the 1950s Aloys Michel found that the Afghan govern-
ment had a policy to “encourage” non-Pashtuns to move
away from the border with Tajikistan, even as it attempted
to develop and populate a district on the river border
(Michel, 1959, p. 119). Regarding the strategic use of Pash-
tunization, Colonel Yate, who coined the term ‘Afghanisa-
tion’ and was one of its architects while he was still a Major,
wrote in 1893 that “It is only the non-Afghan tribes such as
the Maimanah Uzbegs, the Herati Hazarahs and Jamshidis,
etc. that have any intercourse or communication with the
Turkomans or Russians, and once encircled by Afghans they
are safe” (Lee, 1996, pp. 483, 595). The British were to
become allies and sponsors of Abdur Rahman’s Pashtuni-
zation of northern Afghanistan. The ‘Yate plan’ was for the
Pashtuns to dominate the political, social and agrarian life
of Afghan Turkestan (Lee, 1996, p. 482). The precedent for
the Afghanization (Pashtunization) of Afghan Turkestan for
the purposes of defending the frontier was in Herat and
Badghis in the west and northwest of Afghanistan. The
Russians were using ethnic arguments (e.g., regarding the
Turkmen population) tomake a claim on the disputed areas
in the northwest. Abdur Rahman had attempted to secure
the border areas in the early 1880s with Aimaqs. But
distrust, and advice from the British, led the Amir to lateruse his presumably more reliable ethnic kin instead soon
after (Tapper, 1983, pp. 236–237).
Abdur Rahman advanced his economic argument with
these comments in 1885:
“There was an extensive plain in Turkistan which was
lying waste. I had a great mind to make it a cultivated
and inhabited place. [.] So I gave takavi [advances] and
road expenses to such people, and sent them in that
direction” (Tapper, 1983, p. 238).
The British Captain Maitland, through the Gazetteer of
Afghan Turkestan, argued that there was plenty of room in
the north for new migrants:
“The population of the province is small in comparison
with the area. This is partly due to the devastating wars
and to the chaotic conditions of the country before it
came under Afghan rule, but in a great degree to
famine and pestilence. [.] This immigration is
encouraged by the Amir for obvious reasons. There is
plenty of room for a much larger population than now
exists and it is possible that if the province remains
Afghan, and at peace, the Turki-speaking population
may come to be a minority in the next 20 or 30 years”
(Lee, 1996, p. 483).
Lee suspects that a possibly deliberate undercount of
the north’s population served the purposes of both the
British and Abdur Rahman. The British wanted to represent
the north as under-populated to justify its Pashtunization
while the Amir wanted to suppress the acknowledged
number of Uzbeks, Turkmen, Hazaras and Tajiks while
boosting the estimates for Pashtuns in Afghanistan (Lee,
1996, p. 447, n. 7, p. 480, n. 135).
2.4. Pashtunization, cotton and agricultural imperatives in
Kunduz
In the 1880s, in regards to Qataghan, Pashtuns were sent
to Baghlan where there was good irrigable land (Lee, 1996,
p. 484). During Abdur Rahman’s rule political prisoners
from the south were sent north. In Qataghan a penal colony
was established based in Baghlan for some eastern Pash-
tuns and Ghilzais. By mid-1886 about 18,000 families had
moved north. Of these, 18,000 individuals settled in Kun-
duz (Kakar, 1979, pp. 39, 134). According to Erwin Grötz-
bach, Kunduz was, as a part of the former Qataghan
province, a priority in the government’s resettlement of
Pashtuns from the late 1800s to the early 1970s. Agricul-
tural development here played a role as part of Pashtuni-
zation – land reclamation from the Kunduz River basin was
accompanied by the resettlement of Pashtuns (Mielke &
Schetter, 2007, p. 75). In Kunduz, the government did not
resettle Pashtuns just on reclaimed wetlands. As part of
Pashtunization and the economic development of Kunduz,
the Afghan government expropriated a great deal of land
from the local Uzbeks (Shalinsky,1994, p. 27). Pashtuns also
ended up with most of the reclaimed land thanks to
government allotments and sales as well as obtainingmuch
of the pre-existing prime agricultural land by “encroach-
ments on the Uzbek former settlers” (Roy, 1992, pp. 74–75).
This pattern continued far beyond the reign of Abdur
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from the expropriation of large parcels of land, most of
which had belonged to Uzbeks (Schetter, Glassner, &
Karokhail, 2007, pp. 143–144). During the 1920s, King
Amanullah’s government continued to encourage agricul-
tural schemes and colonization, voluntary or involuntary,
by Pashtun farmers and nomads throughout the north
(Centlivres & Centlivres-Demont, 1997, p. 9).
After the 1929 defeat of Bacha Saqao, Pashtuns gained
even more land in the north (Tapper, 1983, p. 258). Nadir
Shah, the new Pashtun ruler of Afghanistan, encouraged
Pashtun migration into Kunduz as part of what Shalinsky
terms his policy of “ethnic politics and extreme Pashtun
favoritism which marked the Musahiban dynasty from
that point on” (Shalinsky, 1994, p. 27). However, it should
be noted that while, as Barﬁeld states, “the Pashtun
strategy was to overwhelm the Uzbek with sheer numbers
of settlers,” land in the Qataghan was “at the time an
expanding resource” thanks to agricultural land reclama-
tion strategies. As a result, Pashtun resettlement in many
areas could proceed without displacing Uzbeks (Barﬁeld,
1978, p. 31). In 1929 and 1930 Nadir Shah encouraged
and sometime even forcibly compelled Pashtuns to
purchase land in the north, especially in Kunduz where,
for example, the Cotton Company of Kunduz was able in
one instance to purchase 1000 acres of land for $1 per
acre. The Cotton Company of Kunduz, cooperating with
the government, played an important role in draining the
“malarial” swamps in Kunduz and opening up new lands
for agriculture (Dupree, 1997, pp. 473–474; Shalinsky,
1994, p. 78). Barﬁeld notes the strong government
support for this agricultural development (as well as rice
farming) and refers to the activities of this company, also
known as ‘Spinzar’ (‘White Gold’), as “the most successful
development project in recent Afghan history” (Barﬁeld,
1978, p. 29). Pashtun settlers were given preference not
just in land distribution but in infrastructural projects.
Government infrastructure projects in non-Pashtun areas,
such as Kunduz, were associated with the inﬂux of Pash-
tuns. These incentives encouraged entrepreneurs such as
Abdul Aziz, a Pashtun businessman who from 1925 pio-
neered cotton production in Kunduz, to purchase land and
drained land for cotton farming (Newell, 1986, p. 112;
Shalinsky, 1994, p. 78). At a lower administrative level,
Sher Khan Nasir, the governor of Qataghan, provided
Abdul Aziz with all the assistance and resources required,
including forced labor (Dupree, 1997, p. 474). Similarly,
Kakar describes the governor of the 1930s as “over-
zealous” in his implementation of population resettlement
and land grants (Kakar, 2006, p. 105). Kunduz’s importance
increased along with the agricultural expansion as Sher
Khan Nasir moved the capital from Khanabad to Kunduz.
And, of course, Pashtuns dominated the government in
Qataghan (Shalinsky, 1982, pp. 79–80). Furthermore, the
economic policies of Prime Minister Hashim Khan (1929–
1946) included the offering of land in Qataghan to
unemployed or landless Afghans (Gregorian, 1969, p. 363).
At the same time, the inﬂux of Pashtuns from the
1930–1950s into Kunduz paralleled the granting of
grazing rights in Kunduz and in Badakhshan for Pashtuns
(Patterson, 2004, pp. 7–8).However, Pashtuns were not the only ones participating
in the cotton-centric agricultural schemes. The Chechka
Uzbeks had eventually become sedentarized, especially
with the introduction of irrigation and swamp reclamation
schemes in the 1930s. The Chechka still continue to be
involved in cotton production. And, according to Erwin
Grötzbach, Kunduz has attracted migrant workers as
sharecroppers or laborers – predominantly Badakhshani
Tajiks – since the mid-1940s to its agricultural sector
(Rasuly-Paleczek, 1998, pp. 214, 217). In the 1970s Nigel
Allen reported that the areas just north of Kabul provide
laborers (i.e., Tajik laborers) to Mazar and Kunduz rather
than to nearby Kabul due to the better wages and oppor-
tunities in the north, possibly because of the low wages in
the Hazara-dominated Kabul laborer market (Allen,1974, p.
123). The fertility of the Kunduz area attracted not only
regular labor migrants, but also those ﬂeeing food short-
ages. An example of this occurred as late as the early 1970s
(Shalinsky, 1994, p. 30).
2.5. Social and demographic effects of Afghan rule
If the land of Afghan Turkestan had not actually been
truly under-populated when Pashtunization began in the
mid-1880s, it was by 1896 when, according to Lee, much of
the province had been “severely depopulated and vast
tracts of once-fertile land lay neglected and uncultivated”
(Lee, 1996, pp. 597–598). From the mid-1880s to the end of
Abdur Rahman’s rule, the north was devastated by a series
of famines, droughts, locust plagues, disease, war and
taxation (Kakar, 1979, pp. 134, 184; Lee, 1996, pp. 481–482,
560, 562, 596–597). As early as 1885 many Uzbeks and
Turkmens in the northwest gave up on living in northern
Afghanistan and ﬂed north to the lands of the Bukharan
Emirate. This process only increased after the defeat of the
Ishaq Khan rebellion. The ﬂow of refugees out of Afghan
Turkestan in the late 1880s suited the Amir, who continued
at this time to encourage Pashtuns to move north. Abdur
Rahman saw these conditions as conducive to reviving his
Pashtunization policy. But other parts of the country had
also been depopulated due to famine and disease and,
accordingly, Pashtuns were unenthusiastic about the
prospect of leaving their homes. In response, Abdur Rah-
man used force and destroyed entire villages in eastern
Afghanistan, especially Ghilzai ones, and exiled the
villagers to the north. The situation in Afghan Turkestan
was so bad that many of the new immigrants ﬂed into
Russian Turkestan. Abdur Rahman responded by deploying
troops along the frontier to stop refugees from escaping
and by offering an amnesty for those already on the other
side, a policy that was only partly successful. In addition,
there were also refugee ﬂows from Russian-controlled
Turkestan to Afghan Turkestan. When Samarkand fell to
the Russians, an undetermined number of refugees crossed
the Amu Darya into Balkh. Also, after the Russian defeat of
the Turkmens at Gök Tepe, large numbers of Turkmen
refugees ﬂed into Afghan territory. During 1884 refugees
were ﬂeeing conﬂict in both directions: Turkmen into
Afghanistan and Uzbek and Turkmen into Russian territory.
However, the number of Turkmens and Uzbeks who ﬂed
Russian rule in Central Asia were outnumbered by those
4 Schurmann, 1962, p. 96. I take this to mean that the Uzbeks at the
very least formed a plurality.
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ﬂed Afghan rule (Lee, 1996, pp. 318, 418, 461, 469, 482, 560–
561, 597–598) while Soviet sources state that many of the
refugees from Tsarist Central Asia returned home (Naby,
1984, p. 9).
As in Russian Turkestan, the Uzbeks often occupied the
irrigated lowlands while Tajiks could be found in the
upland areas. As previously noted, in Afghanistan the
Uzbeks were pushed out of the fertile lowlands by Pashtun
migrants. Roy notes the “complementary places” of Uzbeks
and Tajiks in their ecological niches while remarking that
the Pashtun settlers took “the best of everything” (Roy,
1992, pp. 73–74, 78). For a later example, the arrival of
Pashtun herders from the 1910s to 1940s, and their use of
the land, displaced many Uzbeks and Tajiks, disrupted the
local ethnic balance and caused resentment (Shahrani,
1979, p. 180). As an example of a community divided
along Uzbek-speaking and Pashtun lines, the villages of
Mahmond (Pashtun) and Karluk (Turkic) are in an area
previously used as pastureland by the semi-nomadic
Uzbek-Karluks. The land is now irrigated and inhabited in
part by Pashtun settlers, some of whom employ now-
landless Karluks. Resettled nomads and farmers’ integra-
tion into society in the north has been a difﬁcult and slow
process, leading to some communities being fragmented by
different ethnic groups, sometimes in a hostile manner
(Gawecki, 1986, pp. 8–9, 20). However, Pashtuns in the
north could rely on support since in “a non-Pashtun region
of Afghanistan they could count on government aid in
disputes, or at least biased decisions in their favor”
(Barﬁeld, 1978, pp. 31–32). Pashtuns sent north during
Abdur Rahman’s forced migrations formed villages sepa-
rate from the local Uzbeks and Tajiks. However, some of
these Pashtuns were unable to ﬁnd Pashtun wives and
therefore began to take wives who were Uzbek or Tajik.
This process brought increased ethnic interaction between
the ethnic communities, albeit unequal as Pashtuns here
would never in turn allow their daughters to marry Tajiks
and Uzbeks. The voluntary Pashtun migrants who came to
Kunduz after the 1940s were initially appalled that their
Pashtun predecessors hadmarried Uzbek and Tajik women.
But by the 1960s–1970s they too began to intermarry like
earlier Pashtun immigrants (Dupree, 1997, p. 187–188).
However, smaller villages in remote and marginal areas are
generally more homogeneous (Gawecki, 1986, pp. 8–9, 20).
Divisions between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns played
a role in conﬂicts when, beginning in the 1950s, land
became increasingly scarce (Barﬁeld, 1981, pp. 30–31). By
the 1970s there was an overpopulation of the land in
relation to resources (Roy, 1992, p. 75). The competition
over resources resulted in a political alignment between
Pashtuns and all others in the north referred to by the locals
as Afghaniyya versus Uzbekiyya (Tapper, 1991, p. 29). Sha-
linsky even cited conﬂicts over land between Uzbeks and
Pashtuns that included “pitched battles” (Shalinsky, 1982,
p. 78). But the competition was not conﬁned to just Uzbeks
and Pashtuns. The process of Pashtunization that started in
the 19th century resulted in an informal alliance of Persian
and Turkic speakers against the Pashtuns (Roy,1992, pp. 73,
78). The cleavage between Pashtuns and all others in the
north was also a national issue, since many of the Pashtunsin the north could be considered representatives of the
central government that supported them (Shahrani, 1979,
p. 183). Persian and Turkic speakers in northern Afghani-
stan felt threatened by the Pashtun immigrants not just
because of the loss of their best agricultural lands, but also
because the Pashtuns represented a tool for further control
by the central government (Roy, 1992, p. 78). Pashtuniza-
tion’s land policies were not the sole reason for Uzbek
resentment against the Pashtuns and the government.
Uzbek refugees from Central Asia, who arrived after the
greatest effects of Pashtunization, and who had not lost
land, also became hostile toward the Pashtuns in the north
because of theway the Pashtuns dominated politics and the
economy. According to Shalinsky, the result in this refugee
community was the “development of [an] Uzbek nation-
alist feeling,” particularly among the young males who had
been born and raised in Afghanistan (Shalinsky, 1982, pp.
71, 79).
In regards to the exact demographics of northern
Afghanistan, in the early 1960s the anthropologist Schur-
mann cited the Uzbeks as the “principal population of
Afghan Turkestan” and noted that “Qataghan province is
largely populated by Uzbeks.”4 This belief is echoed by
Montgomery (1979, p. 159). However, Barﬁeld, who spent
much time in northern Afghanistan in the 1970s, instead
uses an early 1970s French source (Gilbert Entienne) that
shows Pashtuns demographically dominating, especially in
areas that were part of the government’s agricultural
development plans (Barﬁeld, 1978, p. 30). But without
a complete census of Afghanistan it is impossible to
ascertain the exact percentages (Naby, 1984, p. 2). The lack
of a census is an issue that has continued to this day and
will likely persist well into the future. It is also difﬁcult to
accurately demonstrate the demography of northern
Afghanistan with a map of ethnic groups. In northern
Afghanistan “An Uzbek village can be followed by a Pashtun
one and then by an Uzbek one” (Roy, 1992, p. 75). The fact
that lines cannot be neatly draw around large areas where
one single ethnic group dominates leads to Olivier Roy’s
conclusion that “all the ethnic maps of Afghanistan are
inaccurate” (Roy, 1992, p. 75). In fact, all ethnic maps of
Afghanistan are based, directly or indirectly, on a Soviet
map published in 1955 in Sovetskaya Etnograﬁya (Anderson,
1978, p. 3). What is clear is that the present-day ethnic
diversity of Kunduz and the former Qataghan region is
remarkable. Included in the population here are signiﬁcant
populations of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Karluks, Hazaras,
Arabs, Moghols, Baluchis and Turkmens (Centlivres &
Centlivres-Demont, 1997, p. 8; Schetter, Glassner, &
Karokhail, 2006, p. 7, 2007, p. 144).
3. Tajikistan
3.1. Pre-Soviet demography of southern Tajikistan
Southern Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan share
a similar pattern of Turkic migration: early pre-Shaybanid
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Shaybanid Uzbeks in the 16th century (Centlivres &
Centlivres-Demont, 1997, pp. 3, 6–7). As a result there are,
in addition to Tajiks, certain Turkic and Uzbek groups
present on both sides of the modern Tajik–Afghan border
thanks to the historically non-existent boundaries that
allowed for population movement back and forth across
the Amu Darya (Jarring, 1939, pp. 13–35, 52–64). Speciﬁc to
southern Tajikistan, the Vakhsh Valley was for centuries
occupied by Turkic Loqay, Qungrat, Qataghan, Durmen, Yuz
and other tribes – groups that are almost always classiﬁed
today as Uzbeks (Kilavuz, 2007, p. 74; Niyazi, 1998, p. 153).
In regards to spatial demographics, anthropologists Pierre
Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres-Demont note that the
“geo-ecological distribution” of Tajiks and Uzbeks in
southern Tajikistan is “to some extent similar to that in
northeastern Afghanistan” (Centlivres & Centlivres-
Demont, 1997, p. 4). Olimov and Olimova describe similar
‘ecological niches’ for Uzbeks (including Uzbek-speaking
Turkic groups) and Tajiks that many have given for
northern Afghanistan:
Before the Russian domination began in the 19th
century [.] In a sense, it was possible to trace ethnic
distinctions by a community’s natural geographical
zones, the altitude of their home above sea level and
certain economic and cultural lifestyles. The percentage
of Tajiks increased as one moved [.] from the lowlands
to the mountains. The percentage of Uzbek and other
Turkic populations was greater in the other areas. The
semi-nomadic Turkic-peoples occupied the steppes and
foothills, suitable for livestock breeding. The land-tilling
Tajiks and Badakhshanis settled along the rivers, in the
irrigated foothills and in the highlands (Olimov &
Olimova, 2002, p. 246).
The area of modern-day south-western Tajikistan (i.e.,
the Vakhsh River region) was, throughout all historical
periods, the isolated periphery of empires or under the
control of various autonomous local powers, but never
home to any strong entity that could project power else-
where. After the collapse of the Timurid Empire, the region
was under ﬂuctuating levels of inﬂuence by the Shaybanid,
Janid and Manghit Uzbek dynasties. In the ﬁrst half of the
18th century, as the Bukharan Emirate started to lose
authority in the area, the Yuz Uzbeks took control of the
Vakhsh Valley and Qabodiyon from their base to the north
in Hisor. And at times during the 18th century the Vakhsh
would come under the control of Kunduz to the south, or
Kulob and Baljovon in the east. In 1870 the Bukharan
Emirate, now under a certain level of Tsarist control for two
years, expanded its control over Qurghonteppa (the core of
the broader Vakhsh Valley region) and Qabodiyon with
Russian assistance. Qurghonteppa, along with other
eastern areas, became a sub-province of Hisor and the
wider region of modern-day southern Tajikistan came to be
referred to as Eastern Bukhara (Akiner, 2001, p. 11; Borjian,
2005). However, the reality of Bukharan power was not
quite so orderly. Hélène Carrère D’Encausse describes
a state where many regions were “living in a situation of
almost total independence or constant rebellion” (Carrère
D’Encausse, 1988, p. 25). The Bukharan Emirate had littlesemblance of territorial integrity as geographic factors of
distance, isolation and mountainous terrain gave the
Eastern Bukharan lands a high level of autonomy
(Sengupta, 2000, p. 399). Especially relevant to Tajiks from
the mountainous regions, mountain dwellers were able,
thanks to their geographic location, to sidestep the Emirs’
attempts at centralized rule. Olimova and Olimov state that
“hill valleys and their inhabitants with small pieces of
cultivated land and no hope for irrigation came together in
small groups and preserved their self-sufﬁcient complex
and independence from the central government”
(Sengupta, 2000, p. 399). Nourzhanov notes that in Eastern
Bukhara “In the eyes of the traditional communities and
their leaders, any centralizing agent constituted a potential
menace” and that “non-Uzbek peasants and beks treated
the Emir as an alien ruler and oppressor” (Nourzhanov,
2008, p. 61).
The population dynamics north of the Amu Darya
stabilized after the 1860s when Russia took control of the
Bukharan Emirate. Then, decades later, a further constraint
on population movements was the ofﬁcial border delim-
itation and closure of the Amu Darya boundary in 1895
(Bushkov, 2000, pp. 148–149). In regards to speciﬁcally the
Qurghonteppa/Vakhsh region, in the late 18th and early
19th centuries the population, estimated at only about
10–20,000, was very unstable with few communities
having “deep roots” in the area (Borjian, 2005). During the
Tsarist era the ﬁrst documented attempts at a census of the
population of the Qurghonteppa region occurred. The
Qurghonteppa Viloyat, as a province of the Bukharan
Emirate, counted 55% of the population as Uzbek and only
18% as Tajik (Schoeberlein-Engel, 1994, p. 288). A later
attempt at the beginning of the 20th century speciﬁcally
counts the immediate Qurghonteppa area in addition to the
region as a whole. According to this survey, the Uzbeks and
other Turkic groups accounted for 96% of Qurghonteppa
(Bushkov, 2000, pp. 163–164). The total population ﬁgures
in the Eastern Bukhara population census of 1917 by the
Bukharan government are reduced by 40–45% from 1913.
Paul Bergne, without elaborating further, assigns this to the
assumption that much of the population died (Bergne,
2007, pp. 163–164). Beyond the obvious debate that could
be made on the accuracies of the census, and the one that
preceded it, are qualiﬁed explanations for the loss of pop-
ulation such as war, disease, famine and migration (Carrère
D’Encausse, 1988, p. 16).
3.2. The Soviet era: cotton agriculture population transfers
The Russian Civil War and the Bolshevik campaigns and
policies in what is now Tajikistan contributed to a mass
migration to Afghanistan, East Turkistan (Xinjiang) and
beyond (Bushkov, 2000, p. 147). From the broader region of
southern Tajikistan (Vakhsh Valley, Kulob and Hisor) over
200,000 people ﬂed to Afghanistan (Abdullaev, 2009, p.
361). The Basmachi–Soviet conﬂict resulted in many
people, mostly from the south, ﬂeeing to Afghanistan.
Although some of these returned, the result was the loss of
half of cultivated land and livestock, as well as the
destruction or decay of irrigation systems (Akiner, 2001, p.
22). The ofﬁcial data shows a 60% decline in the population
5 A term for local anti-Soviet rebels in Central Asia.
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Eastern Bukhara as a total having its population reduced by
42.5% (Penati, 2007, pp. 527–528). By 1925 there started
a large refugee return (Bushkov, 2000, p. 149). The promise
of government assistance and free irrigated land induced
refugees to return from Afghanistan. But while there may
have been refugees returning in 1925, there continued to be
some refugee ﬂows after this date (Penati, 2007, p. 527).
The situation eventually stabilized and, by the end of the
1920s, 60,000 of the over 200,000 refugees who had ﬂed to
Afghanistan had been repatriated (Bergne, 2007, p. 107).
While the new Soviet government institutions had
formulated plans to assist and attract returnees, the local
administrators did not always receive the necessary
resources from the central government, itself short of
resources. Government inefﬁciency and lack of proper
resources caused severe hardships for both the settlers and
the returning refugees, both of whom did not receive the
resources that theywere promised. Furthermore, it was the
Qurghonteppa District that had to accommodate the
majority of returning refugees. This redistribution of pop-
ulations in Tajikistan led to not just material hardship, but
some interethnic tensions as well, such as when Tajik
returnees found Uzbeks occupying their lands, and vice
versa (Penati, 2007, pp. 528–530).
Starting in the mid-1920s the Soviets began to forcibly
resettle people to the south of Tajikistan, primarily to
facilitate the construction of irrigation works and the
production of cotton. The Soviet resettlement policies in
the Qurghonteppa Province (includes the Vakhsh Valley)
were clearly part of its strategy to boost agriculture,
particularly cotton (Bergne, 2007, pp. 72, 88–89, 107;
Bushkov, 2000, p. 149; Foroughi, 2002, p. 49; Kilavuz, 2007,
p. 74; Loy, 2006; Penati, 2007, p. 529). The Hisor and
Vakhsh Valleys offered the best potential for growing
cotton, most of which was to be exported to Russia
(Rakowska-Harmstone, 1970, pp. 54–55). The result in the
Qurghonteppa region was the construction of thousands of
kilometers of irrigation canals as part of the Vakhsh Valley
irrigation system that started in 1931. After this time
numerous groups and individuals arrived in the region to
work on the construction of the canals and in the cultiva-
tion of cotton (Abulhaev, 2009, pp. 143–151; Akiner, 2001,
p. 22; Kilavuz, 2007, p. 74; Roy, 2001, p. 23). However, as
noted by Aziz Niyazi, the resettlement policies were not
guided by a strategy as simple as merely boosting cotton
production:
The active internal migration of the local population in
Tajikistan began in the mid-1920s. This was connected
mainly with the accelerated industrialization of the
republic both in agriculture and industry. The revolu-
tionary goal was promoted to make an industrial and
agricultural proletariat out of the traditional peasantry,
which had constituted the majority of the population.
[.] The settlement policy was aimed at increasing the
number of towns in valleys and large settlement at the
expense of small and middle-sized qishlaqs (villages) in
the mountains. Development of the mountainous
territories was considered to have no future (Niyazi,
2000, p. 169).The ﬁrst Soviet forced migration ‘wave’ in the mid-
1920s to the Vakhsh Valley lowlands of Qurghonteppa
consisted of thousands of Gharmi Tajik households from
the mountainous regions of Qarotegin and Darvoz (Kilavuz,
2007, p. 74; Rakowska-Harmstone, 1970, p. 57; Roy, 2001, p.
23). The immigrants were organized into collective farms –
some mono-ethnic, others mixed. And while extended
family groupings were usually not split up, larger
communities were (Akiner, 2001, p. 22; Bergne, 2007, pp.
72, 88–89, 107; Foroughi, 2002, p. 49; Rakowska-
Harmstone, 1970, p. 33). These population movements to
the south were mainly a process of forced migration
(Niyazi, 2000, p. 169), particularly in regards to mountain
dwellers that were expelled from their homes in the
mountains and sent to the valleys (Rakowska-Harmstone,
1970, p. 33). While force was clearly used to move many
Kulobi and Gharmi Tajiks to the Vakhsh Valley, some
migrants later reported that incentives such as free land
were offered and they had chosen to go voluntarily as they
expected a better life in the valley (Kilavuz, 2007, pp.
74–75).
This ﬁrst phase of force population transfers that started
in 1925 and lasted until 1932 was mostly unsuccessful as
only 30% of the 56,000 resettled households throughout
Tajikistan – including those who were resettled to facilitate
the production of cotton – stayed in their new locations
(Bushkov, 2000, p. 149; Loy, 2006). However, the campaign
continued and throughout the 1930s Tajiks from the Gharm
and Kulob Provinces, as well as Pamiris from Gorno
Badakhshon, were transferred to Qurghonteppa and the
wider region of the Vakhsh Valley. Here they were orga-
nized into collective farms in an area that had previously
been populated by semi-nomadic Turkic speakers, many of
whom had ﬂed the Basmachi5 conﬂict to Afghanistan
(Kilavuz, 2007, p. 74; Roy, 2001, p. 23). The Soviet author-
ities “sedentarized” the remaining Uzbeks and Loqays of
the Vakhsh Valley into collective farms on the foothills
where they were previously living. In Olivier Roy’s words,
Qurghonteppa was “colonized” during the 1950s by Tajik
settlers from Gharm and Kulob who arrived early in the
decade as part of large Soviet population transfers (Roy,
1998, p. 139; 2001, p. 23). For the Gharmi Tajiks from the
mountainous region of Qarotegin, resettlement was not
initially successful. The forced migrants had no skill in the
new type of agricultural work theywere expected to do and
the government, for its part, provided little in the way of
assistance. Furthermore, disease was common (Rakowska-
Harmstone, 1970, p. 57). Unfortunately for the settlers, the
authorities did not provide a sufﬁcient social support
structure in the south. The living conditions endured in the
ﬁrst few years for forcibly resettled populations were quite
bad. There was a lack of infrastructure, water, sanitation,
and proper housing, as well as other issues related to
problems in adjusting to the southern valley climate. New
diseases such as malaria were encountered, medical assis-
tance was minimal, and the summer weather was much
more extreme than what the mountain dwellers were
accustomed to, while the new type of work was very
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Bushkov, 2000, p. 151; Niyazi, 2000, pp. 169–170).
The policies of resettlement into the valleys, which
comprise only 7% of the territory of Tajikistan, resulted in
the density of the population exceeding the capacity of the
land to support that population. According to Niyazi, in the
1920s approximately 70% of the population of Tajikistan
was living in the foothills and mountains. The contempo-
rary situation has been reversed and now 70% of the pop-
ulation lives in the lowlands. Niyazi goes on to describe the
development of Tajikistan and how economic growth did
not keep pace with population growth while the valleys
were overpopulated, resulting in ecological degradation –
including the destructive monoculture of cotton (Niyazi,
2000, pp. 169–171). Niyazi offers a critical appraisal of the
effects of resettlement policies:
Industrialization and intensiﬁcation of agriculture with
the priority given to the development of the cultivation
of cotton destroyed economic structure, which had
remained unchanged for ages. Hundreds of thousands of
peasants and craftsmen had to abandon the way of life
to which they were accustomed and were forced into
a quite different and even alien cultural environment.
Many of them – unable to bear the abrupt changes of
climate and exhausting work, and lacking new qualiﬁ-
cations – became hostages of the state’s migration
policy. [.] Accelerated and mindless industrialization
of this agrarian country, irrational and wasteful use of
natural resources, and violence against peasant culture
led to destructive results both for the environment and
the society. The industrial assault on this essentially
traditional society resulted in degradation in all spheres
of life (Niyazi, 2000, pp. 173–174).
Border issues may also have played a role in population
transfers, as between 1933 and 1941 almost 27,000
households in southern Tajikistan were moved by the state
to the Afghan–Soviet border regions. In the broader
context, from 1925 to 1941, 48,700 households were
transferred into the Vakhsh Valley. For the republic as
a whole, in the period before the start of the Second World
War the state had forcibly resettled 400,000 people, or 30%
of the population of Tajikistan. During the war forced
relocations to cotton growing regions continued. For
example, the government moved 20,000 households from
mountainous areas to the Vakhsh Valley between 1943 and
1947 (Bushkov, 2000, pp. 149–150; Olimova, 2004, pp. 246,
262). The population transfer to the south from 1947 to
1960 again included Tajiks frommountainous areas, as well
as Pamiris. Also, Kulobis in the south were moved from the
foothills to the valleys (Akiner, 2001, p. 23). During the
1950s the state resettled over 100,000 people to irrigable
valleys, Vakhsh included. Eventually, the resettlement
process in Qurghonteppa Province became less regular
after the 1950s until its end in about 1970 (Bushkov, 2000,
p. 150; Kilavuz, 2007, p. 74; Roy, 2001, p. 23).
3.3. Nature of settlements and social patterns
The change in population ratios due to the inﬂux of
Tajiks and Pamiris from the 1950s is difﬁcult to determinesince the published Soviet population data on the area is
vague (Schoeberlein-Engel, 1994, p. 288). But what is clear
is that by the 1980s Qurghonteppa was demographically
dominated by people who were transferred to the area or
who were born to families that were. In the upper Vakhsh
Valley about 90% of the population could be classiﬁed this
way (Tajiks from Qarotegin, the Yovon Valley and Khoval-
ing, Uzbeks from the Ferghana Valley and other parts of
Uzbekistan, as well as Russians). The remaining population
consisted of indigenous Loqay and Kungrat Uzbeks (Akiner,
2001, p. 23). Kilavuz describes the pattern of ethnic and
regional composition in the new settlements:
Many villages were composed mainly of people coming
from the same region, with only a small minority of
people from another region. For example, where
a majority of the village was from Garm [Gharm], there
was usually a minority from Kulyab [Kulob], and vice
versa. People in Qurghonteppa lived in homogenous
villages. If the great majority in one village was from
Garm, the majority in another village was from Kulyab.
There were also entirely Uzbek villages. The majority of
villages in Qurghonteppa were ethnically and regionally
homogenous. Some villages were heterogeneous in
terms of the regional origin of their inhabitants. In these
mixed villages the population composition was roughly
50 percent from Garm and 50 percent from Kulyab or
others. But these cases were very few. Only approxi-
mately 20 percent of all villages in the region were like
this (Kilavuz, 2007, p. 75).
According to interviews conducted by Kilavuz (obvi-
ously of later settlers to Qurghonteppa), those who were
resettled in villages of their co-regionals said that was
partly their choice. The settlers, who preferred living with
family, relatives and “countrymen,” chose to settle in this
pattern for obvious reasons of living near people who could
be trusted and relied upon for support. People even relo-
cated from one resettlement to another in order to be with
people they were familiar with. However, in the towns and
cities the populations were more mixed in regards to
ethnicity and region of origin (Kilavuz, 2007, p. 76).3.4. Effects of transfers
According to Shirin Akiner, the process of forced pop-
ulation transfers “increased social and ethnic segmenta-
tion” while the “atomization of traditional communities
enhanced micro-ethnicities and, perhaps more especially,
micro-loyalties and micro-allegiances” (Akiner, 2001, p.
25). Whole communities that were transferred often ended
up in the same collective farm. For those mixed collective
farms the different groups usually worked in their own
brigades and lived in their own settlements. Olivier Roy
suggests that this resulted in the groups keeping their
distinct regional identities (Roy, 2001, p. 23). Roy notes
further:
Population transfers reduce the oppositions between
lineages and consolidate essentially geographical iden-
tities (one’s place of origin) as primary identities. Para-
doxically, transfer reinforces territorial identity. [.] The
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populations in the province of Kurgan-Teppe (Roy, 2000,
p. 96).
Those people who settled in Qurghonteppa kept their
regional identities (e.g., Kulobi or Gharmi Tajik), even after
decades in the valley had passed. Kilavuz cites people in the
region identifying themselves by the region their grand-
parents came from. They even know the exact village that
their ancestors were from, and can provide it when pressed
on their exact origins. In addition to knowing where their
ancestors came from, they also know where other people’s
ancestors migrated from (Kilavuz, 2007, p. 76). Akbarzadeh
argues that the “minimum-contact” collective farm system
resulted in the various groups keeping their cultural prac-
tices from their homes regions. For example, in the Vakhsh
Valley there are Uzbek collective farms that, in Akbarza-
deh’s words, “have very little to do with their neighboring,
say Gharmi, kolkhozy [collective farms]” (Akbarzadeh,1996,
p. 1107). The immigrants to Qurghonteppa adjusted in
different ways. For example, some assimilated well to
Qurghonteppa while others such as those from Qarotegin
and Darvoz “resisted assimilation” and “maintained
a strong sense of separate identity” (Akiner, 2001, p. 24).
Tajiks resettled from the mountainous areas, especially
Gharm, found their interests in conﬂict with those pop-
ulations already there (Bergne, 2007, p. 72). Forced pop-
ulation transfers and sedentarisation soonput Uzbek Loqay,
Kungrat and Durman in competition for resources with
Tajiks inQurghonteppa (Roy, 2000, p. 96). For thosewho did
not immediately enter into problematic relations, relations
worsened later. According to Akiner, the original inhabi-
tants of the Vakhsh Valley came to resent the eventual
success of the immigrants to the region (Akiner, 2001, p. 42).
A later example in Qurghonteppa is from the 1960s when
Gharmis and Uzbeks were involved in disputes over land
and water. Population and demographics and a shortage of
resources in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in further
increased competition for resources among the groups in
the Vakhsh Valley (Niyazi, 1998, p. 161; Roy, 2001, p. 23).4. Northern Afghanistan and southern Tajikistan:
a brief comparison
The Kunduz River Valley of northern Afghanistan and
the Vakhsh River Valley of southern Tajikistan followed
similar patterns of development starting in the 1920s,
demonstrating that the imperatives of the modern state to
secure frontier regions, boost agricultural production,
diversify its economy and move its population about in
a manner that suits the state’s interests can be seen in
states as radically different as the Soviet Union and
Afghanistan. The Kunduz and Vakhsh Valleys were both
deemed to be unproductive and under-populated. And
since they are so similar in geography and climate it is
unsurprising that the governments in both Kabul and
Moscow saw ﬁt to encourage such similar agricultural
schemes, in particular the industrially signiﬁcant cotton
crop. However, both the Afghan and Soviet governments
implemented population transfer plans that ﬁlled two
purposes: providing the human capital to develop thesetwo frontiers and moving, often forcibly, people whom the
state found inconveniently located. The result, especially in
regards to demographics, was the creation of two socially
diverse and economically signiﬁcant regions that were fully
integrated into their respective state’s economy and poli-
tics. Unfortunately for the inhabitants of northern Afgha-
nistan and southern Tajikistan, the economic importance
and demographic diversity of these two regions would
provide much of the structure for the patterns of violent
conﬂict when war reached the Kunduz and Vakhsh Valleys
during the 1980s and 1990s.References
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